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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLE LEE DeWEGELI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HARRISON G. DeWEGELI, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 860126 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
Plaintiff sought a divorce from defendant by filing a 
verified complaint in the lower court (R. 1-3). Defendant 
answered and counterclaimed alleging, among other things, that 
the parties owned a home and that he should receive one-half of 
the equity in the home (R. 8). 
The parties, prior to separation, both resided in the home 
located at 3301 Mohican, Provo, Utah. In March, 1984, the home 
was in danger of foreclosure and the parties owed numerous debts 
to their personal and business creditors. The financial picture 
of the parties was such that they were not credit-worthy and were 
not in a position to borrow money to pay their debts and save the 
home (R. 110-111) . 
Through and including March, 1984, the parties owned and 
operated, an art gallery business. (R. 109). The parties1 
business and tax obligations existing in March, 1984, related in 
part to said art gallery business (R. 110). 
Defendant deeded his interest in the home and real property 
in question to plaintiff's parents so that plaintiff and her 
parents could obtain a loan against the property to pay the 
parties1 personal and business debts (R. Ill, 170). Exhibit No. 1 
is the deed whereby defendant conveyed away his interest in the 
property. Said exhibit was introduced and received by the lower 
court (R. 27, 34), having previously been recorded in the office 
of the Utah County Recorder under Entry No. 87 4 4 at Book 2124 and 
Page 151, on March 26, 1984, as shown on the face of the exhibit. 
In return for defendant deeding away his interest in the 
property, plaintiff agreed to borrow against the home and to use 
the loan proceeds to pay defendant's share of the family debts 
and obligations (R. 113, 170). 
At the time of the giving of the deed to the home by defen-
dant, the parties were separating and contemplating divorce 
and the deeding of the home was part of a property settlement 
made in anticipation of divorce (R. 113). 
Plaintiff and her parents borrowed the funds and paid 
the debts in question. (Exhibits 3 and 4, R. 170, 179). Since 
the date of the deed, plaintiff has held defendant harmless from 
the business debts and obligations as agreed (R. 113, 114, 115, 
116) . 
Since the date of the deed from defendant, plaintiff has 
made substantial expenditures to repair damages to the home which 
predated the giving of the deed, and plaintiff has made all of the 
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monthly payments on the obligations secured by the home (R. Ill, 
114) . 
The home in question was purchased by the parties with a 
purchase money loan and a substantial down payment from the 
proceeds of a sale of the parties' prior home. (R. 167-168). 
Defendant alleged, in his testimony, that there was a verbal 
understanding that at some unspecified time after some unspecified 
conditions, the ownership of the home would be deeded back to the 
plaintiff and defendant jointly (R. 169-170). Defendant did not 
identify what, if anything, he had done to entitle him to a 
return of the property. (R 169-171). 
Defendant admitted in his testimony that his signing the 
deed was not the result of any coercion, duress or undue 
influence. (R. 177) He further stated he had no conversation or 
understanding with plaintiff's parents prior to signing the deed. 
(R. 180 - 181) 
From the time of the execution of the deed by defendant, he 
abandoned the home and did not reside there. (R. 178 - 179) 
Plaintiff's parents later deeded the property to plaintiff, 
as the only grantee of the deed conveying away their legal 
ownership of the property (Exhibit 2). Plaintiff's parents 
continue to claim an equitable interest in the property and hold a 
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trust deed on the property securing a promissory note given to 
them by plaintiff. (Exhibits 5 and 6) 
Plaintiff's mother stated in her testimony that her ownership 
interest in the property was strictly for security purposes and 
that she had no discussion with defendant and plaintiff as to a 
reconveyance of the property to them jointly, although she would 
have done so if it had been requested by the parties and if she 
had been repaid. (R. 157 - 159) 
Defendant did not dispute that plaintiff had held him 
harmless from and had paid the marital debts in question. 
Defendant did not claim or ever allege that he had paid or repaid 
any portion of said debts or the loss taken by plaintiff and her 
parents to pay said debts and obligations. (R. 170) 
The trial court made the following finding of fact relative 
to the parties1 interest in the home: 
8. The deed from plaintiff and defendant to 
plaintiff's parents was intended as a security interest 
for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents. The deed 
from plaintiff's parents to plaintiff conveying the 
home located at 3301 Mohican, Provo, Utah County, Utah, 
did not alter defendant's interest in the home and the 
home of the parties is found to be a marital asset, 
subject to all existing liens and encumbrances. (R. 65) 
Based upon the above finding, the trial court entered the 
following order in the Decree of Divorce: 
5. The deed from plaintiff and defendant to 
plaintiff's parents was intended as a security interest 
for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents. The deed 
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from plaintiff's parents to plaintiff conveying the 
home located at 3301 Mohican Lane, Provo, Utah County, 
Utah, did not alter defendant's interest in the home and 
the home of the parties is a marital asset, subject to 
all existing liens and encumbrances. Plaintiff's 
parents would have given a deed to defendant had he so 
requested. The conveyance to only the plaintiff, 
therefore, was not intended to terminate defendant's 
interest in the property. (R. 70) 
7. Plaintiff is awarded the home located at 3301 
Mohican Lane, Provo, Utah, until she remarries, the 
youngest child reaches 18 years of age, plaintiff 
vacates the home or plaintiff sells the home, whichever 
occurs first. At the time of such event (unless 
previously sold), the home is to be sold and the equity 
in the home should be divided equally between the 
parties after deducting all costs of sale. The equity 
is to be determined based upon the value of the home as 
of May, 1984, or the time of sale, whichever is the 
lesser amount. (R. 71) 
The above cited findings and orders of the trial court focus 
only upon the issue concerning the deeds as they pertained to 
plaintiff's parents and do not specifically address the deed as 
it affects plaintiff, despite a request that such a finding and 
order be included. (R. 42) 
It is. from the award of a portion of any equity in the home 
to defendant that plaintiff now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-3, 1953, as amended, makes 
interspousal transfers valid to the same extent as transfers 
between other persons. A deed of conveyance from one spouse to 
another which is supported by consideration and which is duly 
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executed, acknowledged, delivered and recorded is not subject to 
being set aside absent clear and convincing evidence establishing 
a basis for cancelling the deed, i.e., fraud, constructive trust, 
etc. 
Plaintiff gave valid consideration for the deed of conveyance 
from defendant by paying certain debts and obligations of the 
defendant and holding him harmless therefrom. Defendant cannot 
now employ general equitable principles to reclaim his property 
interest which was freely and voluntarily contracted away. 
This is not a case where the property in question was placed 
in the name of only one spouse by mistake, inadvertence, a desire 
to avoid taxes or some similar reason. This case involves a 
conscious transfer for consideration at a time when the parties 
were separating and contemplating divorce. 
The evidence presented by defendant did not clearly or 
convincingly establish a basis for setting aside the deed and 
clearly preponderates in favor of plaintiff's position relative 
to the validity of the conveyance. This court should review the 
questions of fact and law and enter judgment for plaintiff 




DEFENDANT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY 
CONVEYED TO PLAINTIFF HIS INTEREST IN THE 
REAL PROPERTY AND IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD 
DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY. 
The undisputed facts presented to the trial court were that 
defendant executed and delivered a deed of conveyance purporting 
to convey all right, title and interest he may have had to the 
real property in question to the plaintiff and her parents. The 
undisputed facts further showed that good and valuable considera-
tion passed between plaintiff and defendant in consideration for 
the deed. Defendant thereafter, through his Counterclaim, claimed 
an ownership interest in the real property notwithstanding the 
deed. 
The law in the State of Utah and the majority rule in other 
jurisdictions is that a deed supported by a valid consideration 
may hot be set aside except upon a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence that certain specified grounds exist for setting aside 
the deed. This principle was clearly stated in the case of Gold 
Oil Land Dev. Corp. v. Davis, 611 P. 2d 711 (Utah 1980). In that 
case the plaintiff sued to declare invalid a deed to certain land 
in Utah County. The trial court found that there had not been 
any consideration given for the deed and that there was an 
invalid delivery of the deed. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
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trial court's findings on appeal and clearly enunciated the 
standard by which a claim to invalidate a deed must be judged: 
Defendants place reliance upon the fact that 
the deed in question was duly acknowledged 
and recorded. With respect thereto we agree 
with these propositions advocated by them: 
That when a deed is duly acknowledged and 
recorded, there arise the presumptions that 
it was duly executed and that there was a 
valid delivery thereof; and further, that 
those presumptions can only be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. at 712. See also, Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 
355 (1934) ; Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 
420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966). 
Another important Utah case which addresses this issue is 
Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984). In the Baker case, the 
personal representative of an estate brought an action to cancel a 
warranty deed given by the deceased and to quiet title in the 
property to the estate. The plaintiff advanced theories of 
resulting trust, invalid delivery, undue influence and failure of 
consideration. The trial court refused to invalidate the deed 
under any of these theories and this Court affirmed. In its 
holding, this Court re-emphasized the standard relating to the 
cancelling or setting aside of a deed as follows: 
Plaintiff contends that the deed was not 
delivered and accepted with the requisite 
legal intent and that at best it must be 
viewed to be a conveyance in trust. Where a 
deed is executed with no intent to transfer a 
present interest, it will be invalidated by a 
court in equity. [Citation omitted.] This 
Court has held that a conveyance is valid 
only upon delivery of a deed with present 
intent to transfer, Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 
2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 (1960). A presumption 
of valid delivery arises where a deed has 
been executed and recorded. Kresser v. 
Peterson, Utah, 675 P.2d 1193 (1984); Con-
trolled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, supra, 
but such a presumption may be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
Gold Oil Land Dev. Corp. v. Davis, Utah, 611 
P.2 711 (1980). 
The recording of a deed in placing 
the names of others on the property 
is somewhat in the nature of a 
public declaration that [the 
grantor] intended the instrument to 
become effective immediately. 
People as a rule do not deliberately 
put a flaw in the title to their 
property, thereby handicapping its 
later disposal, unless they really 
intend to transfer some interest to 
the person whose name is thus 
placed in the record. Allen v. 
Allen, 115 Utah 303, 204 P. 2d 458 
(1949) . 
Id. at 634, 635. 
In the present case, Exhibit 1 clearly established that 
defendant deeded away his interest in the property to plaintiff 
and her parents and that said deed was duly signed, acknowledged 
and recorded in the Office of the Utah County Recorder. In an 
effort to overcome the deed and reclaim an ownership interest in 
the property, defendant presented the following testimony to 
support his claimed interest in the property: 
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Q Was there a proposal made to you about conveying 
the property to her parents? 
A Yes, there was. 
Q Will you tell me about that? 
A I was told at the time in order to — 
Q Who told you? 
A It was my wife Carole. 
Q What did she say? 
A That to — in order to get a second loan on the 
home to pay debts that we would sign the home over to 
her parents. 
Q What would they do with the home? 
A They would — after being signed to them they 
would get a loan, a second loan. 
Q What would they do with that money? 
A To pay the debts. 
Q After they got the loan what would they do with it 
— the home? 
A It was — I was told that the home would be 
returned, would be signed back into my name and my 
wife's name. 
Q Come back to both of you? 
10 
A That was my understanding it was to come back to 
me and her. 
Q Did she tell you at that time she wanted the home 
to come back only to her? 
A No. 
Q If she had told you that she wanted the home only 
to come back to her would you have deeded the property 
to your in-laws? 
A Definitely not. 
Q Did you in fact sign the deed to your in-laws? 
A I did, yes. 
Q Did they obtain a loan? 
A Yes. 
Q Did they us the money to pay the family debts? 
A Yes. 
Q And did they deed the property back to you and 
your wife? 
A No, they did not. 
Q When did you discover that? 
A I don't know the exact date, but a month or so 
later they told me they were sorry I was out of town at 
the time they needed to sign it back over and they just 
signed it to my wife Carole. (R 169-171). 
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There was no argument at trial that the above cited testimony 
established implied trust, failure of consideration, fraud, 
duress, undue influence or any other recognized reason to cancel 
the deed. Defendant merely relied on the equitable powers given 
the trial court by Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, to 
reclaim his alleged interest in the property. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that defendant's reliance 
upon the equitable powers of the trial court to reclaim ownership 
of the property is misplaced. Section 30-2-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, specifically addresses the issue of 
interspousal conveyances and states as follows: 
A conveyance, transfer or lien executed by 
either husband or wife to or in favor of the 
other shall be valid to the same extent as 
between other persons. 
The above cited code section must be considered and given effect 
when considering the equitable powers of the trial court to make a 
distribution of property under Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. Plaintiff respectfully submits that pursuant to the 
above cited statutes, the deed between the parties was valid and, 
while the Court may have inherent powers to make equitable 
divisions of the property, it must first determine legal ownership 
and give due credit to a valid transfer between husband and wife 
under U.C.A., Section 30-2-3. See also Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 
2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954). 
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Plaintiff does not simply rely on the condition of title in 
making the argument herein. Plaintiff does not dispute that 
the status of title by itself is not determinative of the property 
interests of the parties in a divorce action. This Court has 
specifically held that the status of record title to marital 
property prior to a decree of divorce is not binding on the trial 
court in its distribution of such property. The trial court in a 
divorce case is empowered to make equitable distributions and may 
compel conveyances as necessary to achieve the equitable end. See 
Workman v. Workman. 652 P. 2d 931 (Utah 1982) and Jackson v. 
Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980). 
The statutory and case law of Utah recognizes that a husband 
and wife may, for many reasons, jointly acquire property and 
place it in the name of only one of the parties. In such a 
situation the trial court would rightly consider the property to 
oe jointly owned despite record title. Such a situation did not 
sxist in this case. The title to the property herein was always 
leld in the joint names of the parties and the property was 
ilways a marital asset until defendant made a valid conveyance to 
)laintiff of all right, title and interest which he previously 
Leld in the property in question. Defendant's conveyance to 
daintiff is valid pursuant to U.C.A., Section 30-2-3 and may not 
•e set aside under Utah law except by clear and convincing proof 
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of some wrongdoing on the part of plaintiff, i.e., fraud, duress, 
failure of consideration, or other clearly established basis for 
avoiding the consequences of the deed. 
This court has forcefully stated that a party in a divorce 
action may not avoid an interspousal agreement by entering a plea 
in equity. This statement of the Court is found in Land v. Land, 
605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). In that case, this Court considered a 
divorce action where defendant attempted to avoid the effects of a 
written agreement with his spouse giving up rights and privileges 
of property of the parties. The defendant Land asked the court 
to modify the Decree of Divorce which was based upon a written 
stipulation between the parties so as to do equity between the 
parties. The trial court refused to look behind the stipulation 
of the parties to do "equity." This Court affirmed the trial 
court and stated as follows: 
Defendant's contention that the court must 
look behind his stipulation in order to do 
equity is without merit. True it is that, in 
making a division of property by a decree of 
divorce a trial court is governed by general 
principles of equity. It is likewise true 
that the court retains continuing jurisdiction 
over the parties and may modify the decree 
due to changes in circumstances, equitable 
considerations again to govern. It must, 
however, be added that, when a decree is 
based upon a property settlement or agreement, 
forged by the parties and sanctioned by the 
court, equity must take such agreement into 
consideration. Equity is not available to 
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily 
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contracted away simply because one has come 
to regret the bargain made. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 1250-1251. 
While the facts of Land v. Land, supra, involved an agreement 
presented to and approved by the trial court, the principle 
enunciated governs the issue in the present case. A party may not 
use the inherent equitable powers of the Court in an effort to 
reclaim property rights which were voluntarily contracted away. 
This principle applies equally to rights contracted away in 
negotiations between the parties outside of the Court context, as 
well as to those actually submitted to and approved by the Court. 
Defendant voluntarily contracted away his property rights by deed 
to the plaintiff for valuable consideration and should not have 
been allowed by the trial court to use the equity argument to 
reclaim the rights which he had freely and voluntarily given up. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND THIS COURT HAS THE POWER 
TO REVIEW THE FACTS AND ENTER JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
It is clearly established law in the State of Utah that this 
Court will not disturb the findings of fact in an equity case 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial 
court's findings. Baker v. Patteef supra; Bown v. Loveland, 678 
P.2d 292 (Utah 1984); Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 
15 
P.2d 811 (1972); First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Hall, 29 
Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1972). The cited cases also clearly 
stand for the proposition that the Court may, upon request, 
conduct a new and independent review of both questions of law and 
questions of fact and may substitute its judgment for the trial 
court where the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial 
court's decision. 
The evidence in the present case clearly preponderates 
against the trial courtfs findings. Defendant's position most 
strongly stated in his direct testimony is that plaintiff told 
him if he deeded the property to her parents that her parents 
would then make a gift to the parties by borrowing money against 
the property to pay the marital debts of the parties and that the 
parents would then reconvey the property to the plaintiff and 
defendant. (R. 169-171). 
On cross examination defendant admitted the following: 
Q (By Mr. Lambert) Mr. DeWegeli, that is your 
signature on that deed, isn't it? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q You don't claim that you were incompetent at the 
time you signed that deed, do you? 
A No. 
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Q And nobody coerced you or tried to force you to 
sign that deed, did they? 
A No. 
Q You went down and signed the deed at Security 
Title and Abstract Company, it that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Who was with you when you did that? 
A Just my wife. 
Q And then you then asked — or the both of you 
asked Security Title to record the deed, is that true? 
A Yes. 
Q And as indicated on the deed, it was recorded, is 
that your understanding? 
A Yes. 
Q Now you during this — certainly after this deed 
was executed you did leave the home, didn't you? 
A Yes. I went down to St. George, Utah. 
(R. 177-178). 
• * * 
Q Prior to your signing this deed, that is Exhibit 
No. 1, did you have any conversations with your 
mother-in-law? 
A As to what? 
17 
Q Concerning the deed? 
A No, not to my recollection. (R. 180-181). 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above facts as 
presented at trial cannot, as a matter of law, establish fraud, 
constructive trust, invalid delivery, failure of consideration or 
any other recognized theory upon which to void the transfer. 
Defendant's failure to even discuss the giving of the deed with 
plaintiff's parents precludes any right to rely on their purported 
willingness to simply give back his interest in the property 
after paying his debts. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to examine the 
facts as set forth in the record and this brief which clearly 
indicate that defendant forwarded no legal theory upon which he 
should avoid the contractual arrangement he made with plaintiff. 
Absent such evidence, the court's findings and order are clearly 
erroneous and must be reversed with judgment to be entered in 
favor of plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff does not merely rely upon the status of title to 
defeat defendant's interest, but relies upon the clear evidence 
that defendant freely and voluntarily contracted away his rights 
to the property in question and cannot now enter a plea that the 
trial court has inherent equitable powers to reclaim his rights 
18 
and privileges to the property. The evidence before the Court 
simply does not justify cancelling the deed and this Court 
should reverse and enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
awarding her all right, title and interest to the real property 
in question. J^ „ 
DATED this *?( day of IHMI 1986. 
V< DAVrtf LAMBERT,/for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'1-I hereby certify that on the ~> ( day of 
1986, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellatefs 
Brief were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Respondent 
290 West Center 
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Our File No. T6,602 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLE LEE DeWEGELI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARRISON G. DeWEGELI, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 69,539 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 
9th day of September, 1985. Plaintiff was present with her counsel, D. David 
Lambert. The defendant was present with his counsel, Brian C. Harrison. The Court 
received testimony and evidence from each of the parties and after consideration 
thereof and after considerations of the pleadings on file, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce, divorcing her from the 
defendant, which shall be final and absolute upon filing and entry in the office of 
the Utah County Clerk. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the parties' 
minor child, Cindy DeWegeli, subject to reasonable rights of visitation for the 
defendant. 
3. Plaintiff is restored her maiden name of Carole Lee Hoffman. 
4. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff for the support and 
maintenance of the minor child the sum of $200 per month beginning with September, 
1985, and continuing until the child reaches her age of majority. The defendant is 
ordered, as additional child support, to provide health, accident and dental 
insurance for the minor child and pay for medical or dental expenses not covered by 
such insurance. 
5. The deed from plaintiff and defendant to plaintiff's parents was 
intended as a security interest for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents. The 
deed from plaintiff's parents to plaintiff conveying the home located at 3301 
Mohican Lane, Provo, Utah, Utah County, Utah, did not alter defendant's interest in 
the home and the home of the parties is a marital asset, subject to all existing 
liens and encumbrances. Plaintiff's parents would have given a deed to defendant 
had he so requested. The conveyance to only the plaintiff, therefore, was not 
intended to terminate defendant's interest in the property. 
6. Plaintiff's parents, Lorna Hoffman and Alvin John Hoffman, are not 
parties to this action and the Court makes no determination as to the validity of a 
third trust deed on the home of the parties given to the Hoffmans by the plaintiff, 
nor does the Court make any determination as to the Hoffman's interest in the 
property in question. 
Upon a subsequent determination in an appropriate action, if it is determined 
that the trust deed given to the plaintiff's parents by plaintiff is not a valid 
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encumbrance, then in that event it would not be a lien upon the marital assets of 
the parties. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded the home located at 3301 Mohican Lane, Provo, 
Utah, until she remarries, the youngest child reaches 18 years of age, plaintiff 
vacates the home or plaintiff sells the home, whichever occurs first. AT the time 
of such event (unless previously sold), the home is to be sold and the equity in 
the home should be divided equally between the parties after deducting all costs of 
sale. The equity is to be determined based upon the value of the home as of May, 
1984, or the time of sale, whichever is the lesser amount. 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded the business known as Ledo Art Gallery, 
also known as University Art Center, as her sole and separate property. 
9. Each party is awarded those items of personal property which are 
presently in their possession. 
10. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of the marital debts and 
obligations, with the exception of the debts relating to the home and the business, 
which are to be paid by the plaintiff, and except for the medical and dental 
obligations which are to be paid in whole by the defendant. 
11. Neither party is entitled to any award of alimony or support from the 
other party. 
12. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant in the sum of 
$1,000 as attorney fees against the defendant. 
13. Plaintiff is entitled to an order to withhold and deliver from the 
3 
defendant's income in accordance with the provisions of § 78-45d-2, et sea., Utah 
Code Annotated, 1952 as amended in 1985. 
DATED thisX-/ day of January, 1986. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
F--BRIAN C. HARRISON 






LICT COURT JUDGE 
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D. DAVID LAMBERT, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
" " "" M ! J ^ tSur.File No. 16,602 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLE LEE DeWEGELI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARRISON G. DeWEGELI, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 69,539 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 
9th day of September, 1985. Plaintiff was present with her counsel, D. David 
Lambert. The defendant was present with his counsel, Brian C. Harrison. The Court 
received testimony and evidence from each of the parties and after consideration 
thereof and after considerations of the pleadings on file, the Court hereby makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both plaintiff and defendant are residents of Utah County, State of 
Utah, and have been fore more than three months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action for divorce. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant were married on the 20th day of December, 
1960 and since that date have been and now are husband and wife. 
3. There is one minor child of this marriage whose full name and date 
of birth are: Cindy DeWegeli, June 3, 1969. 
4. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties' minor child, subject to reasonable rights of visitation 
for the defendant. 
5. Defendant, by his repeated course of conduct, is verbally abusing 
the plaintiff and by his abandonment of the plaintiff and the minor child, has 
treated the plaintiff cruelly, causing her great mental distress and suffering and 
entitling her to a decree of divorce. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to be restored her maiden name of Carole Lee 
Hoffman. 
7. The defendant should pay to the plaintiff for the support and 
maintenance of the minor child the sum of $200 per month beginning with September, 
1985, and continuing until the child reaches her age of majority. The defendant 
should, as additional child support, provide health, accident and dental insurance 
for the minor child and pay for the medical or dental expenses not covered by such 
insurance. 
8. The deed from plaintiff and defendant to plaintiff's parents was 
intended as a security interest for obligations owing to plaintiff's parents. The 
deed from plaintiff's parents to plaintiff conveying the home located at 3301 
Mohican, Provo, Utah County, Utah, did not alter defendant's interest in the home 
and the home of the parties is found to be a marital asset, subject to all existing 
liens and encumbrances. 
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9. Plaintiff's parents, Lorna Hoffman and Alvin John Hoffman, are not 
parties to this action and the Court makes no determination as to the validity of a 
third trust deed on the home of the parties given to the Hoffmans by the plaintiff, 
nor does the Court make any determination as to the Hoffman's interest in the 
property in question. 
10. Plaintiff should be awarded the home located at 3301 Mohican Lane, 
Provo, Utah, until she remarries, the youngest child reaches 18 years of age, 
plaintiff vacates the home or plaintiff sells the home, whichever occurs first. At 
the time of such event (unless previously sold), the home is to be sold and the 
equity in the home should be divided equally between the parties after deducting 
all costs of sale. The equity is to be determined based upon the value of the home 
as of May, 1984, or the time of sale, whichever is the lesser amount. 
11. Plaintiff should be awarded the business known as Ledo Art Gallery, 
also known as University Art Center, as her sole and separate property. 
12. Each party should be awarded those items of personal property which 
are presently in their possession. 
13. Each party should be ordered to pay on-half of the marital debts and 
obligations, with the exception of the debts relating to the home and the business, 
which are to be paid by the plaintiff, and except for the medical and dental 
obligations which should be paid in whole by the defendant. 
14. Neither party is entitled to any award of alimony or support from the 
other party. 
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15. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of 
$1,000 as attorney fees against the defendant. 
16. Plaintiff is entitled to an order to withhold and deliver from the 
defendant's income in accordance with the provisions of § 78-45d-2, et sea.. Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended in 1985. 
From the foregoing Findings of Facts, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce 
on the grounds of mental cruelty and that such Decree shall become final upon entry 
in the records of the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The plaintiff is entitled to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the minor child of the parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation to the 
defendant. 
3. The parties are entitled to orders entered concerning the issues of 
real property, personal property, debts and obligations, child support, alimony, 
insurance, and attorney's fees as more fully set forth in the foregoing Findings of 





APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
d-
BRIAN C. HARRISON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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WARRANTY DEED 
HARRISON G. DEWEGELI and CAROLE L. DEWEGELI,
 u i s wife 
Grantor...., of.. Provo, Utah 
hereby CONVEY.... A N D WARRANT.... t/% ALVIN J. HOFFMAN and LORNA M. HOFFMAN, 
husband and wife, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship 
Grantee s of _ 17100 Holiday Drive, Morgan Hill 
iXrmt Addrvw 
for the sum of. 
Calif . 95037 
City County 
$10.00 and other valuable consideration - - -
the following described tract of land in.... 




Lot 18, Block 10, Plat "A", INDIAN HILLS SUBDIVISION, Provo, Utah, 
according to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the 
Recorder, Utah County, Utah. 
Subject to restrictions, easements, covenants and right of ways of record, 
visible by inspection or otherwise. 
WITNESS THE HAND..?, of said Grantor?... this .?P.H}._ _ day of 
March
 % A D 1 9 84 
Signed in the nresence of 
.Ham'son C\ TJew rri G Dewegeli 
Carole L. Dewegeli 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of ££?*?. 
On the ?2S! day ol.. March 
before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, . 
Carole L. Dewegeli, h i s wife 
, A. D. 19..?A..., personally appeared 
Harrison G. Dewegeli and 
the signer .§. ol the above instrument, who duly acknowl me that .. the.X-^ eocecuted the same. 




V'"ML~» C ' -
i » t V 
Courwtv of SECURITY TITLE & ABSTRAC 
MAIL TAX NOTICE TO 
Grantees 
2 
. 55 I f t t c i^tmp<r££>, Utah 84601 
en I l* 12 » 
15436 
WARRANTY DEED 
Grantor. . . . ,^ M o r j g n . j m j ; * ^ ^ ^ 
hereby CONVEY.... AND WARRANT.... to CAROLJJL^.DEWEGELI.. 
Grantee...., o £ . . 3 ^ J ^ . ^ i ? f . ? . . t a . ? S .?H£vf.. 
StrMt Addr*u City 
Utah 
for the sum of . .JJiS^.Q9.J^- .9jy?.S^ 
the following described tract of land in a . 




Lot 1 8 , B lock 1 0 , P l a t "A", I n d i a n H i l l s S u b d i v i s i o n , P r o v o , Utah , 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o f f i c i a l p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e i n t h e o f f i c e o f t h e 
R e c o r d e r , Utah County, U t a h . 
S u b j e c t t o r e s t r i c t i o n s , e a s e m e n t s , c o v e n a n t s and r i g h t o f ways of 




WITNESS THE HAND..S. of said Grantor...? this l l t h 
J f c y - . , A. D. 19. 
Signed in the presence of 
84 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of ...UTAH 
On the l i . ^ . day of £?.X , A. D. 19.. . .M., personally appeared 
before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, . 
Hoffman, his wife 
Alvin J. Hoffman and Lorna M. 
the signer..?. of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that .:-he~Y. executed the same. 
'< , 
•' Q J I y» ccanfaiissiori expires .67.18/198.6. Residing at-.-Prjoizo., U t a h , 
:kn owl edged to e tnat ..-ne.... executed the sa e. 
jy Notary Public 
. "=3— 
MAIL TAX NOTICE TO 
Courtwv of SECURITY TITLE & ABSTRACT CO.. 55 £ • « C«nt«r, Provo. Utah 84601 X 
' # mf •* I 
without notice to Borrower, be acccleratiwi and became immediately due and payaMe; ft>} agrees to pay to Holder all lawful collection 
costs and legal expenses, including: reasonable attorney's fees; and (c) agrees that any payments from whatever source shall first he 
applied to Holders collection costs and legal expenses and then to interest and principal as aforesaid. Waiver of any default shall oot^ 
^ H d t l g ^ ^ ^ ^ :&k**S&$^ 
